It has recently been shown that by linking collective decisions the incentive costs can become negligible and, at the limit, ex ante efficiency can be achieved. In a voting situation this implies that the agents' intensity of preferences can be taken into account even in the absence of monetary transfers. Rather than considering a limiting result we want to analyse what can be achieved while we consider a finite number of linked decisions. We first characterise the set of implementable mechanisms and show that ex ante efficiency can never be achieved. We then proceed to relax the efficiency requirement and prove that, even when we just require unanimity, the mechanism cannot be sensitive to the agents' intensity of preference when the domain of preferences is unrestricted.
Introduction
In a recent paper Jackson and Sonnenschein (JS 2007) show that the linking of collective decisions leads to large efficiency gains: in the limit, incentive costs can be totally overcome and the ex ante efficient allocation can be achieved. 1 Their paper is inspired by the storable votes mechanism proposed by Casella (2005) where voters, who interact repeatedly over time, are allowed to trade-off their interests across time by storing unused votes for future decisions.
Both these papers show that if a number of public decisions are linked the resulting allocation is superior to that achieved when the decisions are made separately. Using a mechanism that links decisions improves the overall allocation by allowing the intensities of agents' preferences to affect the outcomes of individual decisions. However, the design (JS 2007) or welfare properties (Casella 2005) of these mechanisms rely heavily on the prior distribution of preferences. In this note we extend their line of reasoning to examine whether mechanisms exist that not only take into account the intensity of preferences when transfers are forbidden, but are also robust to any specification on the priors. 2 Section 3 provides an affirmative answer to this enquiry. However, any incentive compatible mechanism can only depend on the agents' relative valuation across decisions (i.e. it will bunch all proportional types). This implies that the ex ante efficient outcome can never be reached as long as the number of linked decisions is finite. It also implies that a taxation principle can be stated for this environment: any mechanism can be replicated by a point-voting mechanism where agents are endowed with a perfectly divisible point that can be allocated freely between the linked public decisions. 3 Since the limiting ex ante efficiency result of JS (2007) does not hold when the number of decisions is finite, in Sect. 4 we consider whether a weaker form of efficiency is achievable. We show that no mechanism that is sensitive to the intensity of preferences can satisfy the (much weaker) unanimity property for a finite number of decisions when the domain of preferences is unrestricted. 4 We finish this paper by relating our work to the existing literature in Sect. 5.
Our analysis has a wide variety of applications. Examples of public decisions where transfers are simply not viable include the allocation of resources within a government department, and the regulation of mergers. Perhaps more significant however, are situations such as policy referenda, or the allocation of pupils to schools, where transfers may be feasible but are ruled out on moral grounds.
The model
There are n agents facing a decision problem D over the set of alternatives D = {a, b} (e.g. a set of bills that need to be approved or dismissed); u i is the difference in 1 Fang and Norman (2006) show an analogous result when there is transferable utility. 2 We consider robustness in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) . In our setting this is equivalent to strategy-proofness (i.e. implementation in dominant strategies). 3 In a previous paper (Hortala-Vallve 2009), we have shown the properties of a particular mechanism that endows agents with a fixed number of votes that can be distributed among a predetermined number of issues. When there is a majority of votes towards the approval (dismissal) of any issue, the issue is approved (dismissed). 4 When all voters wish the same outcome on a particular public decision, unanimity requires this outcome to be implemented with certainty. agent i's utility between the two outcomes u i = u i (b) − u i (a) ∈ O ⊂ R; the joint distribution from which these differences are drawn is common knowledge. A social choice function f is a mapping from utility differences (u 1 , . . . , u n ) to the probability of implementing alternative b (alternative a is implemented with the complementary probability).
Definition 1 (JS 2007)
A social choice function f on a decision problem D is ex ante Pareto efficient if there does not exist any social choice function f on D such that
. . , u n )} for all i with strict inequality for some i.
A much weaker efficiency requirement than ex ante Pareto efficiency is the unanimity property. Unanimity is a necessary condition for ex post efficiency which is, in turn, a necessary condition for ex ante efficiency.
Definition 2 A social choice function f on a decision problem D satisfies Unanimity whenever it implements the alternative preferred by all agents (whenever such alternative exists). That is
We consider a series of K linked decision problems D. Given the Revelation principle, we restrict our attention to direct revelation mechanisms g that map the revealed preferences over the K decision problems into the set of probability distributions on
s preferences over the K decision problems, and u denotes the profile of all agents preferences over all decision problems. g k (u) denotes the marginal distribution under g on the kth decision problem when agents declare u. The utility over the linked decisions is simply the sum of utilities over each decision. Finally, a strategy for agent i is a mapping from his own preferences to his revealed ones.
Requiring a linking mechanism to satisfy the unanimity property implies that the unanimity property is satisfied in each of the K decision problems. Our unanimity notion follows from assuming the Pareto principle, i.e. no overall outcome is selected when there is another outcome that is preferred by all.
Robust linking mechanisms
The mechanism proposed by JS (2007) relies heavily on knowing the prior distribution from which the utility profiles are drawn. The same occurs with the equilibria and optimality properties of the alternative mechanisms to Majority Rule that Casella (2005) and Hortala-Vallve (2009) propose.
Majority Rule is a mechanism that, in the present setting with K linked decision problems, is robust to any specification of the priors (i.e. it is always optimal to truthfully reveal the type on each decision problem), but fails to take into account the intensity of agents' preferences. 5 It remains to be shown whether there are mechanisms that satisfy both properties; this is our aim in this Section. Bergemann and Morris (2005) show that requiring a mechanism to be robust to any specification of the priors (interim implementation for all possible type spaces) in private value environments is equivalent to ex post implementation and is also equivalent to dominant strategy implementation or strategy-proofness. A mechanism is strategy-proof whenever it is a dominant strategy for any agent to reveal his preferences truthfully. That is,
We define the indirect utility of agent i in equilibrium as
We can extend the usual one-dimensional screening techniques, due to Mirrlees (1971) , to our environment and characterise all implementable mechanisms in the following way.
Lemma 1 (Rochet 1985) The linking mechanism g :
The necessity of both conditions stems from applying the envelope theorem and using the first and second order conditions that arise from the truthtelling condition. The sufficiency is immediate given the multilinear specification of the agents' utilities.
Proof Sufficiency. The envelope Theorem directly implies that, wherever U is differentiable,
Given that the first order condition is satisfied for all u ∈ O K n it can be differentiated with respect to θ yielding:
The second order condition implies that the first matrix is negative semidefinite, hence the second matrix should be positive semidefinite.
Necessity.
One can easily reverse the previous reasoning to obtain the local conditions. We simply need to prove that the conditions are global. A continuously differ-
Using (1) and the Definition of U (u i , u −i ) we can obtain the global condition.
The convexity condition implies that the marginal distribution on decision problem k is, ceteris paribus, weakly increasing in any agent's declaration on that decision problem. That is:
Moreover, the convexity condition implies that the utility function of each player is differentiable almost for all preference profiles. Therefore we do not require any regularity condition on the set of solutions of our problem, instead, these are derived from the truthtelling conditions. 6 Condition (1) together with the definition of U imply that any strategy-proof mechanism should satisfy the following linear first-order partial differential equation for almost all preference profiles
An extended version of Euler's Theorem (see Osborne 2006) , implies that the former equality is satisfied if and only if U is homogeneous of degree one on 7 We can thus characterise all strategyproof mechanisms in a very simple way.
Proposition 1 The linking mechanism g : O K n → (D K ) is strategy-proof if and only if the agents' indirect utilities are HD1 and convex on their own preferences. That is, U is HD1 and convex on u i for almost all (u
This result implies that g k , the marginal distribution on decision problem k, is homogeneous of degree zero. In other words, the mechanism bunches all proportional types. This fact alone is not surprising, but characterising all implementable allocation under the convexity and homogeneity conditions is, to our knowledge, new to the literature. 8 Proposition 1 is stronger than the standard result that agents' incentives in any game are not changed if the von Neumann Morgenstern utilities are multiplied by a constant. Strategy-proofness implies that the expected utility of declarations u i and λu i (λ > 0) coincide. However, this is weaker than the requirement that the mechanism remains unchanged on every dimension when the agent's declaration is multiplied by a positive scalar. 9 Moreover, our result is not solely a necessary condition for strategy-proofness but, together with the convexity condition, it is a full characterisation of all strategy-proof mechanisms.
JS (2007) states that by linking more decision problems "the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible". This result can be reviewed in the light of Proposition 1. The homogeneity result on g k implies that the message space of any strategy-proof mechanism has one dimension less than the preference space. Hence, as we link more decision problems together the homogeneity condition tends to bite less and we can get arbitrarily close to the first best. Proposition 1 also implies that, as long as we consider a finite number of linked problems, the ex ante Pareto efficient allocation can never be achieved. Such an allocation would require us to compare the valuations of all the agents in each decision problem, which is unfeasible given the homogeneity result.
Finally, Proposition 1 implies that any agent is indifferent between declaring his own preferences or declaring these normalised by the L 1 norm, for example (i.e. such that the absolute value of its components sum to 1). As a consequence, a Taxation Principle can be stated in our environment allowing us to replicate any direct mechanism with a very simple indirect one.
Corollary 1 (Taxation Principle) Any strategy-proof mechanism of K linked decision problems can be replicated by a mechanism which endows agents with a perfectly divisible point that can be distributed among the decision problems.
We could rephrase the Corollary as follows: any multidimensional screening problem without transferable utility can be replicated by a mechanism with money. The role of the numeraire is simply to smooth transactions and allow the mechanism to compare the preferences of individual agents across decision problems. 10 Finally we should note that there are plenty of mechanisms that satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1 and still take into account the agents' intensity of preferences.
8 Proposition 1 can be applied to any multidimensional situation without transfers. For instance, in a Bayesian Nash setting, the convexity and homogeneity conditions need simply be imposed on the interim utilities. 9 It could be the case that the allocation (i.e. the K -dimensional vector of probabilities) changes when we multiply the declaration of player i by a positive scalar while keeping his expected payoff constant. This may ease the truthtelling constraints of a different player and could affect the welfare properties of the mechanism. 10 Similar reasoning is developed in Abdulkadiroglu (2006) .
Consider for instance the mechanism that normalises the declared preferences of every agent by its euclidean norm and adds these values for all agents: 11
An impossibility result on linking decisions
We have seen that it is not possible to implement the ex ante Pareto efficient social choice function when K is finite. It remains to be shown whether a weaker form of efficiency can be achieved in the finite setting.
In this section we will show that even using the considerably weaker condition of Unanimity, the linking mechanism cannot do any better than a mechanism that deals with each decision problem separately. That is, any strategy-proof and unanimous mechanism cannot be sensitive to the agents' intensity of preferences.
Definition 3 The linking mechanism
is sensitive whenever there exists two preference profiles with identical signs in all decision problems that implement different allocations. That is,
We need an unrestricted domain assumption for our result to hold true. 13
Definition 4 The domain of individual profiles is unrestricted when there exists δ > 0 such that the open ball of radius δ centered at the origin is a subset of the agents' set of preferences, i.e. B δ (0, . . 
This condition suffices to ensure that the domain of preferences towards each decision problem contains positive and negative values, and to ensure that the agents' relative preference among any two decision problems is unbounded. At the end of 11 We can extend the set of strategy-proof mechanisms that are sensitive to the agents' intensity of preferences as follows:
this section we show that our impossibility result can be avoided when one of these requirements is dropped. The impossibility of implementing sensitive and unanimous mechanisms in the case with two agents is proved by induction on the number of linked decision problems. The first step in the inductive proof is given by Proposition 1: intensity of preferences can play no role when we consider a single decision problem. We then show that the unanimity property implies that any mechanism inherits the properties of mechanisms dealing with fewer decision problems. This is proven by constructing an iterative process during which the preferences of each agent are modified so that by the end there is a unanimous will in a decision problem. Under this scenario, the unanimous will is implemented -and the inductive hypothesis implies that the mechanism cannot be strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive. Finally, we show that in order to preserve strategy-proofness in every step of our iterative process, the mechanism can never be sensitive.
The Theorem itself is then proved by induction on the number of agents. We define a linking mechanism for n − 1 agents from the mechanism with n agents as follows:g(u 2 , u 3 , . . . , u n ) = g(u 2 , u 2 , u 3 , . . . , u n ). The proof relies on showing that the mechanism with n agents inherits the unanimous, sensitive and strategy-proof properties of the linking mechanism with n − 1 agents. Therefore, the inductive hypothesis together with the impossibility of implementing sensitive and unanimous mechanisms in the case with two agents proves the Theorem that is stated below.
Theorem 1 (Impossibility) There exists no mechanism for K linked decision problems that is strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive in an unrestricted domain.
JS (2007) show that by linking decision problems the strategy where declarations are budgeted guarantees an expected utility close to the ex ante expected utility. This implies that even though unanimity may not be preserved when we have a finite number of decision problems (Theorem 1), such mechanisms should satisfy the unanimity property as we increase the number of linked decisions with probability going to 1.
Our parallelism with JS (2007) should be taken with a pinch of salt because they use a different solution concept: Bayesian implementation instead of dominant strategy implementation. Relaxing our equilibrium criteria from dominant strategies to Bayesian Nash avoids the impossibility result-Casella (2005) and Hortala-Vallve (2009) show that in a setting with i.i.d. and symmetric (around the origin) priors there are mechanisms that are sensitive to the agents' intensity of preferences and satisfy the unanimity property. The conditions on the distribution of preferences for which our impossibility result holds remains an open question.
In impossibility results it is often the universality assumption on preferences that is able to buy the result. For our results to hold true, a necessary condition is that preferences need to be diverse enough. Proposition 1 implies that any linking mechanism bunches all proportional types so the vectors of preferences need to be diverse in their direction rather than their modulus. The diversity of preferences and the unanimity property imply that the mechanism cannot be sensitive to some preference configurations. However, the mechanism may still be sensitive to some other preference configurations, sayũ ∈ O K n . In that case, the mechanism shows a strong discontinuity by stopping to be sensitive in the path fromũ to a preference profile where unanimous wills hold. This strong discontinuity plays against the incentive constraints for truthtelling and we can always find an agent that has incentives to misreport.
The impossibility theorem can be trivially avoided by restricting the domain of preferences to settings where unanimous preferences will never exist. Similarly, we can drop the unboundedness condition and circumvent the impossibility problem. 14
Related literature
Most of the literature on mechanism design assumes the availability of transfers. In the multidimensional case, Rochet and Chone (1998) , using calculus of variations with an inequality constraint techniques, establish that bunching is robust even when the distribution of types is very regular. Proposition 1 extends this bunching result to the case where monetary transfers are not allowed.
Within the literature on mechanism design without transfers, the Gibbard-Satterthwhaite (G-S) Theorem states that in an election with three or more outcomes and where we assume agents' preferences have universal domain, the only strategy-proof and onto mechanisms are dictatorial (see Gibbard 1973; Satterthwhaite 1975) . Gibbard (1977) shows further that the G-S Theorem still holds when we allow lotteries across outcomes: a mechanism "if it is to preclude individual strategic manipulation, must be a probability mixture of schemes, each of which either (i) accords a monopoly of influence to a single voter, or (ii) restricts the final outcome to a fixed pair of alternatives." We depart from this work by allowing the mechanism to use cardinal information on the agents' preferences, and by not requiring the allocation to belong to a (K − 1)-dimensional simplex. In this way we avoid the impossibility result and provide a set of mechanisms that take into account the agents' intensity of preferences. Our work also shows that whenever we allow the use of cardinal preferences and randomisation across outcomes the results on voting by committees no longer hold. Barbera et al. (1991) shows that in a multidimensional setting where agents have separable preferences, only mechanisms where each agent announces a subset of 'chosen' alternatives can be implemented. LeBreton and Sen (1999) extend this result and show that such mechanisms need to be decomposable, in the sense that the allocation on each dimension depends only on the message sent on that dimension. Instead, we have shown that once we allow for separable cardinal preferences and randomisation in the final outcomes there are strategy-proof mechanisms that are not decomposable.
We have seen that requiring the mechanism to satisfy the unanimity property implies that the agents' intensity of preferences can no longer play a role. A parallel result in Hylland (1980) shows the G-S Theorem holds whenever the unanimity property 14 For instance, consider a situation with two decision problems and two agents where utilities can only take values in the set O = {−2, −1, 1, 2}. The following is a strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive mechanism: first, implement unanimous wills; second, if agents have opposed preferences in both decision problems (u k i · u k j < 0 for k = 1, 2) and agent 1 values decision problem l more intensely (|u l 1 | > |u l 2 |) and agent 2 values decision problem k more intensely (|u
2 ) (where λ > 0 is arbitrarily small); third, approve all remaining issue with probability 1/2. is also imposed. 15 Once again, our work differs in that it does not require the final allocation to belong to a (K −1)-dimensional simplex. In other words, our mechanism implements the probabilities of approving K independent decisions (i.e. an element in [0, 1] K ) rather than the probability of electing 1 representative out of K candidates (i.e. an element in K −1 ).
Finally, it is worth noting that interest in the intensity problem when transfers are forbidden has been growing in various fields. Eliaz et al. (2006) analyse a situation where, depending on their relative aversion towards disagreement, voters may choose to abstain; Borgers and Postl (2006) show that no efficient mechanism exists for a setting where two agents have to elect a representative out of three; and Abdulkadiroglu (2006) provides an improved mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods where intensity of preferences can be elicited and the achieved allocation is at least as good as the random serial dictatorship allocation.
Appendix: Impossibility theorem proof
Definition 5 The linking mechanism g :
where σ (·) denotes any permutation of n elements.
Definition 6
The linking mechanism g : O K n → (D K ) is neutral with respect to decision problem k (k = 1, . . . , K ) if it does not depend on the positive or negative labelling of decision problem k. That is,
whereũ i is equal to u i except that all preferences in problem k are multiplied by minus one.
Lemma 2 We can assume, without loss of generality, that any strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive mechanism is anonymous and neutral with respect to decision problem k for any k
Proof Consider first a strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive linking mechanism that is not anonymous with respect to agents 1 and 2 and define the new linking mech-
It is immediate to prove that, given the properties of g, the new linking mechanismg is strategy-proof, unanimous, sensitive and anonymous with respect to agents 1 and 2.
Second, consider a strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive linking mechanism that is not neutral with respect to decision problem 1 and define a new linking mechanism as follows:
It is immediate to prove that, given the properties of g, the new linking mechanismg is strategy-proof, unanimous, sensitive and neutral with respect to decision problem 1.
Lemma 3 If the linking mechanism g
. . , n} and k ∈ {1, . . . , K } such that the mechanism is sensitive to agent i's intensity over decision problem k.
Proof Since g is sensitive there exist two profiles (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and (v 1 , . . . , v n ) with the same sign that reach different allocations. Now consider the iterative process in which we switch the preference of one agent on a decision problem from u k i to v k i . At the beginning of the process the mechanism implements g(u 1 , . . . , u n ) and at the end it implements a different allocation, g(v 1 , . . . , v n ). Therefore, in at least one step of the process the mechanism must vary its allocation. That is, whenever one agent varies the intensity of his preference in one decision problem, the mechanism implements a different allocation.
Lemma 4 Whenever n = 2, there exists no mechanism of K linked decision problems that is strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive.
Proof We prove this result by induction on the number of linked decision problems. Strategy-proofness (Proposition 1) implies that the mechanism cannot be sensitive when K = 1. Now, assume the claim is true for K − 1 decision problems and that it is not true for K decision problems. That is, there exists a strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive K -linking mechanism. Relabelling the decision problems if necessary and taking into account Lemmas 2 and 3 we have that there exist, u 1 , −u 2 >> 0 and a > b > 0 such that: 16
Whenever agent 1 declares a negative preference in problem 2(−u 2 1 ) the mechanism can no longer be sensitive. This is because there are unanimous wills in decision problem 2 hence the mechanism deals with K −1 decision problems -to which the inductive hypothesis applies. Therefore, g 1 ((x, −u 2 1 , . . . , u K 1 ), u 2 ) =ḡ 1 for all x > 0. Strategy-proofness implies that when x is large enough, agent 1 should not have incentives to declare (a, u 2 1 , .
16 u i >> 0 should be read as u k i ≥ 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K. 17 In most proofs we specify the incentive constraints of an agent that has an arbitrarily large valuation on a particular issue. Knowing that all implementable mechanisms are homogeneous of degree zero in the agents' declarations (Proposition 1), implies that we can equivalently assume that the agent's valuations on the remaining issues are arbitrarily small.
Neutrality with respect to decision problem 2 implies g
2 )) =ḡ 1 for any u 1 2 < 0. In particular, for large enough |u 1 2 | we have that the above reasoning applies again andḡ 1 ≤ g 1 ((b, u 2 1 , . . . , u K 1 ), u 2 ) needs to hold. Both weak inequalities are incompatible with (1).
Lemma 5 If the linking mechanism g
is not sensitive, the allocation in each decision problem can only depend on the agents' valuations on that decision problem.
Proof Non-sensitiveness implies that the same allocation is implemented given the
, for all λ > 0 and u i ∈ O K . If the allocation in a decision problem depends on the valuation over various decision problems, we have that there exists a large enough λ > 0 for which agent i has incentives to manipulate his declaration.
Note that Lemma 5 implies that whenever the mechanism is anonymous and not sensitive, the allocation in each decision problem can only depend on the number of agents that value that decision problem positively and the number of agents that value it negatively. In other words, anonymity and non-sensitivity together imply that each decision problem is evaluated independently.
Theorem 2 There exists no mechanism of K linked decision problems that is strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive.
Proof We prove the result by induction on the number of agents. Lemma 4 implies that the mechanism cannot be sensitive when n = 2. Assume the claim is true for n − 1 agents and that it is not true for n agents. That is, there exists a strategy-proof, unanimous and sensitive n-agent mechanism.
We now define a linking mechanism for n − 1 agents from the mechanism with n agents: 18g
Step 1g is strategy-proof and unanimous It is immediate thatg inherits the unanimity property from g. Strategy-proofness for agents 3 to n also follows immediately from the strategy-proofness of g. We just need to prove that agent 2 has no incentives to deviate. That is, the following inequality should hold
Strategy-proofness and anonymity of g implies that the following chain of inequalities holds.
Step 2 g cannot be sensitive when u i = u j , for i = j.
Step 1 implies thatg is a strategy-proof and unanimous mechanism for n −1 agents. Hence, the inductive hypothesis applies andg cannot be sensitive. Now consider a preference profile where two agents value all decision problems equally. Lemma 2 allows us to assume, without loss of generality, that these agents are agents 1 and 2. Firstly note that g cannot be sensitive to the preferences of any agents other than 1 or 2 (otherwiseg would be sensitive). Secondly, assume that the mechanism is sensitive with respect to agent 1's preferences on decision problem 1:
Strategy-proofness implies that g 1 cannot increase when agent 2's valuation in decision problem 1 decreases:
Finally, note that the LHS of (2) and the RHS of (3) need to coincide given that g is not sensitive. Therefore, g cannot be sensitive whenever two agents value all decision-problems equally.
Step 3 g cannot be sensitive with respect to any decision-problem where there are at least two agents with positive preferences and two agents with negative preferences.
Assume agents 1 and 2 value decision problem 1 positively, and agents 3 and 4 value it negatively. Furthermore, assume that the mechanism is sensitive to agent 1's preferences on decision-problem 1. 
.). Both weak inequalities are incompatible with (4).
Step 4 g cannot be sensitive with respect to any decision problem Strategy-proofness implies that a sensitive linking mechanism varies its allocation in at least two decision problems in response to a variation in the intensity of an agent's preferences. Given Step 3, we know that in these two decision problems the minority views are only represented by one agent. There are three possible scenarios: (1) there is an agent that holds minority views on both decision problems; (2) the minority views are always represented by a different agent and there are more than three agents; and (3) the minority views are always represented by a different agent and there are only three agents.
Scenario 1 Agent 1 holds minority (and positive) views on decision problems 1 and 2. u andũ are two preference profiles with equal sign such that g 1 (u) = g 1 (ũ). An analogous argument to the argument used in the proof of Step 3 implies that g 1 (u) and g 1 (ũ) are bounded below by g 1 (u 1 , u 2 , u 2 . . . , u n ). Whenever agent 1 has a negative valuation on decision problem 2, g 2 needs to be equal to zero (unanimity property) and an inductive argument analogous to the one used in the proof of Lemma 4 implies that the mechanism can no longer be sensitive. Therefore, g 1 (u) and g 1 (ũ) are bounded above by g 1 ((u 1 1 , −u 2 1 , u 3 1 , . . . , u K 1 ), u 2 , . . . , u n ). Finally note that Lemma 5 implies that the two bounds coincide, so g 1 (u) = g 1 (ũ).
Scenario 2 Whenever agent 1(u 1 >> 0) only holds minority views on decision problem 1 we can replicate the proof from scenario 1. We just need to highlight that when agent 1 has a negative valuation on decision problem 2, there are at least two agents with positive preferences and two agents with negative preferences in decision problem 2 (this is true provided there are strictly more than three agents). Therefore, Step 3 and an inductive argument similar to that used in Lemma 4 imply that the mechanism is not sensitive.
Scenario 3
We finally need to prove that the mechanism cannot be sensitive when there are three agents and none holds minority views in more than one decision problem. Given the existence of only three agents, the mechanism cannot be sensitive with respect to more than three decision problems at the same time. Otherwise, there would exist an agent that holds minority views on more than one decision problem (scenario 1).
Whenever the mechanism is sensitive with respect to three decision problems the proof is analogous to those given above. We just need to realise that when an agent switches the sign of his preference on a decision problem where he is in majority, the mechanism can no longer be sensitive because there is an agent that holds minority views in more than one decision problem (scenario 1).
We now prove the case where the mechanism is sensitive with respect to two decision problems. Assume agents 1 and 2 hold minority (and positive) views on decision problems 1 and 2, respectively. When the linking mechanism is sensitive we can assume, without loss of generality, g k (a, b) := g k ((a, −1), (−1, b) , (−1, −1)) > g k ((1, −1), (−1, 1), (−1, −1)) =ḡ k for some a, b > 1(k = 1, 2). Note that g k (a, b) is weakly increasing in both arguments (Proposition 1) and takes values on the compact set [0, 1] therefore lim a→∞ g 1 (a, a) = g ∞ is well defined.
For a large enough a, agent 1's positive valuation on decision problem 2 should have only a small effect on the allocation in the first decision problem (otherwise he would have incentives to misreport his true valuation). That is, ∀δ > 0, ∃ā > 0 : ∀a >ā, |g 1 ((a, +1), (−1, a) , (−1, −1)) − g ∞ | ≤ δ.
At the same time, strategy-proofness for agent 2 implies that the allocation in decision problem 2 should be arbitrarily close to the allocation that is insensitive to the intensity of agents' preferences when minority views are negative (which we denote 1 −ĝ 2 ). If this were not true he would have incentives to misrepresent his true sign on decision problem 1. That is, Note that the allocation in decision problem 2 is arbitrarily close to the highest possible allocation in the absence of unanimous wills. Therefore, strategy-proofness implies that this allocation is almost insensitive to the preference intensities of agent 1. That is, ∀δ > 0, ∃â > 0 : ∀a >â and ∀λ < a, g ((λ, 1) , (−1, a) , (−1, −1)) −(g ∞ , (1 −ĝ 2 )) ≤ δ.
Whenever λ = 1 and agent 2 holds preferences (−1, 1), neutrality with respect to decision problem 2 (Lemma 2) and anonymity imply that 
Now consider the LHS in (5) and reduce agent 1's preference in decision problem 1. Strategy-proofness implies that g 1 ((λ, 1), (−1, 1) , (−1, −1)) ≤ḡ 1 , for any λ < 1. Moreover, with λ arbitrarily small, strategy-proofness for agent 1 implies that the allocation on decision problem 2 should be arbitrarily close to (1 −ĝ 2 ).
The final step of the proof is to note that under the preference profile ((λ, 1), (−1, a) , (−1, −1)), agent 2 has incentives to lie and declare (−1, 1) so that he improves the allocation on decision problem 1 at negligible cost for decision problem 2.
